




























































1.  Introduction: Currency Unions and “Home Bias” 
Is “dollarization” associated with enhanced international economic integration?
1  We 
examine the behavior of countries that are or have been members of international currency unions, 
and ask whether existing currency unions replicate the desirable features of optimal currency areas 
as set out by Mundell (1961).   Specifically, we ask whether the countries and political units that 
constitute currency unions are as integrated economically as regions within nations.  We find that 
while a common currency enhances economic integration, the degree of integration is far smaller 
than within nations 
A number of studies have shown that national borders inhibit economic integration.  Internal 
trade is disproportionately large compared to international trade; relative prices are more stable 
inside countries than across national boundaries; domestic assets tend to be held disproportionately, 
and so forth.  Perhaps the large size of this “border effect” is mostly the result of exchange rate 
volatility or, more generally, the consequence of having different national moneys.  The objective of 
this paper is to investigate this hypothesis. 
This paper is empirical.  Our strategy is to exploit data on the many existing currency unions.  
We differentiate between intranational political unions (i.e., sovereign states with a single currency 
but also common laws, political environments, cultures, and so forth), and international currency 
unions (i.e., sovereign countries that have delegated monetary policy to some international or foreign 
authority but retain sovereignty in other domains).  The United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom are examples of political unions.  Behavior of regions within these countries is the focus of 
the emerging literature on intranational economics (Hess and van Wincoop (2000), Bachetta, Rose 
and van Wincoop, 2001).  The CFA Franc Zone, and the East Caribbean Currency Area are 




Our approach is to ask whether currency unions exhibit the type of economic integration that 
Mundell (1961) argues is desirable for an “optimum currency area”.   We measure a number of 
economic characteristics for international monetary unions, intranational political unions and other 
countries.  Mundell’s framework implies that the gains from a common currency are proportional to 
the size of international transactions.  Using disaggregated international trade data, we find that 
currency unions are more open and more specialized than non-currency union countries of 
comparable size.  More directly, we examine international trade patterns.  Using a gravity equation, 
we find that trade between members of a currency union (e.g., Brunei and Singapore) is indeed much 
higher than trade between comparable countries with their own currencies, by a factor of over three.  
However, even this sizable effect is small in comparison with the “home market bias” which shows 
that intranational trade is higher than international trade by a factor of almost twenty, even for units 
of comparable economic size.  That is, our estimates show that a hypothetical country which is as 
large (in terms of population, GDP, geographic area and so forth) as Brunei and Singapore combined 
would engage in much more intranational trade than Brunei and Singapore do in reality. 
We examine real exchange rates and deviations from purchasing power parity.
2  The 
volatility of real exchange rates is lower for members of currency unions than for countries with 
independent currencies.  But much of this effect stems from the fact that no currency union has 
experienced a hyperinflation; low inflation countries with sovereign currencies have real exchange 
rate volatility that is only modestly higher than that of currency union members.  Currency union 
members do not have detectably different rates of mean-reversion in their real exchange rates.  
Compared to the benchmark of exchange rates between cities in comparably sized countries, 
currency unions exhibit slightly more integrated prices. 
We also investigate other characteristics of currency unions.  We find that business cycles are 




with sovereign currencies, but not as much as regions of a single country.  Finally, we examine risk 
sharing between members of currency unions and countries with independent currencies, by 
examining consumption and income, and find only a small impact of currency union on risk 
sharing.
3 
We conclude that members of a common currency area are more economically integrated 
than non-currency union members, but not nearly as much as those that are fully politically 
integrated.  That is, dollarized countries are more likely to satisfy Mundell’s criteria for being 
members of an optimum currency area, but not nearly as much as regions within a single country. 
International trade entails foreign exchange transactions, unless it occurs between members 
of common currency areas.  While we ordinarily think of such costs as being small (at least for 
OECD countries facing deep liquid foreign exchange markets), avoiding it seems to have non-trivial 
consequences.
4  So, currency unions may encourage integration.  We are concerned with the 
association between integration and currency unions.  We do not consider whether causality flows 
from integration to currency union (integrated countries are more likely to join and remain in 
currency unions), in the reverse direction (currency union induces integration), or both.
5   
In section 2 below, we provide a gross characterization of currency union members, taking 
special note of their openness and specialization.  We analyze the impact of currency union 
membership on international trade in section 3, and the impact on prices in the section that follows.  
Section 5 examines the international synchronization of business cycles, while section 6 looks at risk 
sharing.  The paper concludes with a brief summary and conclusion. 
 
2.  Characterizing Currency Union Members 
We begin our analysis of common currency areas by providing an aggregate description of 





2.1  Openness 
Our first (macroeconomic) data set consists of annual observations for 210 “countries” 
between 1960 and 1996 extracted from the 1998 World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 
CD-ROM.  The list of countries is tabulated in the appendix Table A2.  This data set includes all 
countries, territories, colonies and other entities covered by WDI (all are referred to as “countries” 
for simplicity), and is extremely comprehensive.
6  The data set has been checked and corrected for 
mistakes. 
In this data set, some 1891 (country-year) observations (24% of the sample) were members 
of a common currency area; the list of countries is tabulated in Table A1.  We include: members of 
common currency areas (such as Benin, a member of the CFA franc zone); countries which operated 
without a sovereign currency (such as Panama which uses the US dollar); long-term 1:1 fixers where 
there is substantial currency substitution and essentially no probability of a move from parity (such 
as the Bahamas); and colonies, dependencies, overseas territories/departments/collectivities (such as 
Guadeloupe).  Anchor countries (such as the US and France), whose currencies are used by others, 
are tabulated solely for reference (i.e., they are not included as currency-union members in our 
empirical analysis).
7 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for both the whole sample of available 
observations, and for (periphery) currency union members.  The number of available observations is 
tabulated along with the means and standard deviation.  There is also a p-value for a t-test of equality 
of means for currency union members and non-members. 
Table 1 indicates that members of currency unions tended to be poorer and smaller than non-
currency union members.  Currency unions are associated with lower and more stable inflation.  




be because they tend to be poor.  A better indicator of their financial markets may be the fact that the 
spread of the domestic loan rate above LIBOR tends to be lower (even after one has excluded high 
inflation observations).  The country-specific standard deviation of the output growth rate, a crude 
measure of output volatility, seems to be similar for currency union members and non-members.  
Finally, there is little indication that currency unions are associated with either more or less fiscal 
discipline. 
What of openness?  Currency unions are more open than countries with their own currencies.  
Both exports and imports are larger as percentages of GDP to a degree that is both statistically 
significant and economically important.  Interestingly, while export duties are lower, import duties 
are higher for currency union members, as is the importance of trade taxes.   This is probably 
because most currency union members have poorly developed income and value added tax bases.  
Currency union members run current accounts that are larger (in absolute value) as a percentage of 
GDP, and also more variable.  Currency unions are also more open to private capital flows, and to 
foreign direct investment.  That is, both the intertemporal and the intratemporal evidence indicate 
that currency union members are more open to capital than non-members. 
Succinctly, members of currency unions seem to be more open to international flows of 
goods, services, and capital than countries with their own currencies.  But one can overstate the 
importance of these differences.  Currency union members tend to be small countries, which are well 
known to be more open than larger countries.  Accordingly, in section 3 we control for size and 
income in determining whether membership in a common currency area is systematically associated 
with more intense trade. 




2.2  Specialization 
  Given that members of currency unions are more open to international influences than 
countries with their own currencies, it is natural to ask if members of common currency areas are 
also more specialized and therefore potentially more vulnerable to asymmetric industry shocks.  
Kenen (1969) first discussed specialization in this context. 
One way to examine this question would be to compare production structures and see if 
currency union members are more specialized in production.  However the data set necessary to 
examine this question does not exist.  Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the patterns of 
specialization exhibited by countries engaging in international trade.   To examine specialization 
patterns manifest in international trade, we exploit the “World Trade Data Base” (WTDB), the 
second data set that we exploit extensively in this paper. 
The WTDB is a consistent recompilation of United Nations trade data, discussed in Feenstra, 
Lipsey and Bowen (1997).
8  The WTDB is estimated to cover at least 98% of all trade.  Annual 
observations of nominal trade values (recorded in thousands of American dollars) are available in the 
WTDB for some 166 countries from 1970 through 1995; the countries in the WTDB data set are 
tabulated in Appendix Table A3.
9  These observations are available at the four-digit (“sub-group”) 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) level (revision 2).  There are a total of 897,939 
observations in this three-dimensional panel (goods x countries x years).  A typical observation is the 
exports (totalling $740,000) from South Africa of SITC good 11 in 1970.
10 
  For each country-year observation, we compute the Herfindahl index, a measure of 
specialization.  The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared shares of the individual goods, defined 
as: 
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where  ijt x  denotes the exports for country i of SITC subgroup j in year t,  it X  denotes total exports 
for i in year t, and the summation is taken over all SITC subgroups.  H is bounded by (0,1]; a high 
value of H indicates that the country is specialized in the production of a few goods. 
We have some 3,045 country-year observations of the Herfindahl index for the WTDB.  Of 
these, 388 (some 13%) are for countries that are members of currency unions.  As Table 2a shows, 
Herfindahl indices for countries with their own currencies are systematically lower (averaging .23) 
than those for members of currency unions (which average .31).  That is, members of common 
currency areas tend to be more specialized.  The difference is not only of economic importance; it is 
also statistically significant (the t-test for a difference in means is 5.7).  Currency union members 
also export (122) fewer sub-goods on average than countries with their own currencies, consistent 
with the hypothesis of greater specialization (again, the difference is statistically significant with a t-
statistic of 17.7). 
It might be objected that currency union members are smaller and poorer than other 
countries, so that more specialization is to be expected.  We control for these other factors by 
regressing the Herfindahl index on the Penn World Table (mark 5.6) measure of real GDP per capita, 
population, and a dummy variable that is unity if the country-year observation is for a currency 
union member.  The results are tabulated in Table 2b.  They show that our conclusions are 
insensitive to the addition of controls for real GDP  per capita, country size, and either country- or 
time-specific fixed effects.  Currency union members consistently have higher Herfindahl indices 
and export smaller numbers of goods.
11 
  To summarize, members of currency unions are more open than countries with their own 
currencies.  They are also more specialized.
12 




3.  Trade Integration 
  In this section of the paper, we show that members of currency unions systematically engage 
in more international trade.  This question is of obvious interest since the benefits from using a 
single money in terms of saved transactions costs depend on the amount of trade between two 
regions, as recognized since at least Mundell (1961).  We follow Rose (2000) in using a “gravity” 
model of international trade as our framework.  In particular, we ask whether bilateral trade between 
two countries is higher if they both use the same currency, holding constant a variety of other 
determinants of international trade.   
The large literature which employs the gravity model of international trade points to distance, 
income levels and country size as being the most critical drivers of bilateral trade flows, a result 
which we corroborate here.  The precise model we employ is completely standard and can be 
written:  
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where  ij X  denotes the value of bilateral trade between countries i and j, CU is a binary dummy 
variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency and zero otherwise, Dij denotes the distance 
between countries i and j, Y denotes real GDP, Pop denotes Population, Z denotes a vector of other 
controls, the b and d coefficients are nuisance coefficients, and e denotes the residual impact of all 
other factors driving trade .  The coefficient of interest to us is g, which measures the impact of a 
common currency on international trade.  A positive coefficient indicates that two countries that use 
a common currency also tend to trade more. 
We begin by estimating this equation using 1995 data from the WTDB, augmented by data 




overseas departments, colonies, and so forth (referred to simply as “countries” below) for which the 
United Nations Statistical Office collects international trade data are included in the data set.  
Country location (used to calculate Great Circle distance) is taken from the CIA’s web site, which 
also provides observation for other variables of interest such as: contiguity, official language, 
colonial background, area, and so forth.
13  Real GDP and population are taken from the 1998 World 
Bank World Development Indicators CD-ROM.
14 
Estimation results are contained in Table 3.  OLS is used, and robust standard errors are 
recorded parenthetically.  At the extreme left of the table, the simplest gravity model is employed; 
that is, no auxiliary Z’s are included.  The b coefficients indicate that the gravity model works well, 
in two senses.  First, the coefficient estimates are sensible and strong.  Greater distance between two 
countries lowers trade, while greater economic “mass” (proxied by real GDP and GDP per capita) 
increases trade.  These intuitive and plausible effects are in line with the estimates of the literature; 
they are also of enormous statistical significance with t-statistics exceeding 20 (in absolute value).  
Second, the equation fits the data well, explaining a high proportion of the cross-sectional variation 
in trade patterns. 
While it is reassuring that the gravity model performs well, its role is strictly one of auxiliary 
conditioning.  We are interested in understanding the relationship between currency union 
membership and trade flows after accounting for gravity effects.  Even after taking out the effects of 
output, size, and distance, there is a large effect of a common currency on trade.  The point estimates 
indicate that two countries that share a common currency trade together by a factor of exp(1.88) @ 
6.5!  This effect is not only economically large, but also statistically significant at traditional 
confidence levels (the t-statistic is 3.3). 
  One can think of a number of reasons for this strong result.  At the top of the list would be 




other omitted variable(s).  But this hunch is mistaken; the results are robust.  Four different 
perturbations of the gravity model are included in Table 3; they augment the basic results with extra 
(Z) controls.  These extra effects are usually statistically significant and economically sensible, 
though they add little to the overall explanatory power of the model.  Being partners in a regional 
trade agreement, sharing a common language, having the same (post-1945) colonizer, being part of 
the same nation (as e.g., France and an overseas department like French Guiana), and having had a 
colonizer-colony relationship all increase trade by economically and statistically significant 
amounts.  Landlocked and large countries tend to trade less; islands trade more.  But inclusion of 
these extra controls does not destroy the finding of an economically large and statistically significant 
positive g.  While the coefficient falls somewhat with extra controls, the lowest estimate of g in 
Table 3 indicates that trade is some 285% higher for members of a common currency than for 
countries with sovereign currencies. 
Rose (2000) estimated a number of gravity equations with a comparable data set spanning 
1970 through 1990, and found similar results; his point estimate of g was 1.2.  He also showed his 
results to be robust to: the exact measurement of CU, the exact measure of distance, the inclusion of 
extra controls, sub-sampling, and different estimation techniques. 
To summarize: members of a currency union trade more, ceteris paribus.  A reasonable 
estimate is that trade is three times as intense for members of a common currency area as for 
countries with their own currencies.  While this estimate seems provocatively high, it is actually 
quite low compared with the well-documented size of “home bias” in international trade.  McCallum 
(1995) and Helliwell (1998) find home bias in goods markets to be on the order of 12x to 20x, far 
greater than our estimates here.  While membership in a common currency area does intensify trade, 
it does not intensify it nearly enough for common currency areas to resemble countries. 




4.  Price Integration 
  Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 633) mention two of the main benefits of currency union as: 
•  Reduced accounting costs and greater predictability of relative prices for firms 
doing business in both countries and 
•  Insulation from monetary disturbances and speculative bubbles that might 
otherwise lead to temporary unnecessary fluctuations in real exchange rates 
(given sticky nominal prices) 
 
  In this section, we explore whether real exchange converge in currency unions are more 
stable in the sense of converging more quickly and having lower short-run volatility.  To answer the 
first question, we estimate the equation 
 
    ij ij ij ij Z CU qroot e d b a + • + + = . 
 
Here,  ij qroot  is the estimated autoregressive coefficient in an AR1 regression for the (log of the) real 
exchange rate of country i relative to country j.  A large value of  ij qroot  indicates slow adjustment 
of the real exchange rate.   ij CU  is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if countries i and j 
were in a currency union for the entire post-1960 period, and a zero otherwise.   ij Z  is a vector of 
auxiliary conditioning variables (such as the distance between countries i and j, the volatility of the 
nominal exchange rate, etc.) that are included in the regression as controls, but that are not directly 
of interest to us.   ij e  is a random error that contains factors that affect the speed of adjustment of real 
exchange rates that are not included in our regression. 
  We hypothesize that  ij b  is negative: that the persistence of real exchange rates is lower for 




exchange rate volatility, one measure of success is the speed at which real exchange rates converge 
to equilibrium.   
  Our real exchange rate data is based on annual consumer price indices and exchange rates 
from our World Bank macroeconomic data set.  For each country in the data set, we first estimate an 
AR1 regression (with intercept, given that the price data is in index form) for (log) real exchange 
rates from 1960-1996.
15  We use the slope coefficient in these time-series regressions as the 
regressand in the cross-section regression defined above. 
  The results reported in Table 4 indicate no support for the hypothesis that real exchange rates 
adjust more quickly in currency unions.  The first column of the table reports results for the basic 
regression.  In addition to the currency union dummy variable, the regression contains the log of 
distance (in miles) between countries i and j; a dummy variable for whether i and j are divisions of 
the same country (e.g., metropolitan France and Guadeloupe); the standard deviation of the first 
difference of the log of the nominal exchange rate; and a constant.  The currency union dummy 
variable has a positive sign, but is not statistically significant at conventional levels.    
  The other variables in the regression are not directly of interest to us, but we note that two 
variables are highly significant in this and each of our other specifications: the same-country 
dummy, and the nominal exchange rate volatility.  As we expect, the coefficient on the same-country 
dummy is negative, indicating that real exchange rates adjust more quickly for these pairs.  Also 
unsurprisingly, the speed of adjustment is significantly faster when nominal exchange rate volatility 
is higher.  Transitory real exchange rate volatility is closely associated with volatile nominal 
exchange rates.  When shocks to nominal exchange rates are very large and lead to large 
misalignments of real exchange rates, there is rapid adjustment. 
  The other specifications in Table 4 introduce other control variables (not reported in the 




not appreciably alter the effect of the other regressors.  The third column includes all of the control 
variables as the second column, but also includes a dummy variable for each country.  In this 
specification, the currency union dummy variable is significant, but with a positive sign.  That is, 
real exchange rates are more persistent in currency-union countries.  The fourth and fifth regressions 
reported in Table 4 control for high inflation in alternative manners.  The regression in the fourth 
column includes the maximum annual inflation rate of each country, while the regression of the fifth 
column is identical to the base specification reported in column 1 but excludes all countries that have 
experienced high inflations.  (High inflation is defined here as average inflation that exceeds 100 per 
cent.)  We find the coefficient on the currency union dummy is not changed under these 
specifications.  The bottom line from Table 4 is that being a member of a currency union does not 
increase the speed of adjustment of real exchange rates. 
  There is a logical inconsistency in the approach taken in Table 4.  We want to allow for 
differing speeds of adjustment of real exchange rates.  But if we model the real exchange rate of 
countries i and j as an AR1, and the real exchange rates of countries i and k as an AR1 with a 
different speed of adjustment, then the real exchange rate of countries j and k cannot follow an AR1.  
More generally, we would want to model the adjustment of the real exchange rate of two countries i 
and j as depending not only on its own lags, but on the lags of real exchange rates of countries that 
are economically integrated. 
  To handle this problem, Table 5 reports results from first-order VARs of real exchange rates 
for groups of countries.  The real exchange rates for members of currency unions are grouped 
together.  Countries that are not members of currency unions are grouped by continent.  The statistic 
reported in Table 5 for each group of countries is the largest (in absolute value) eigenvalue of the 




persistence in the vector of real exchange rates.  The larger is this eigenvalue, the more slowly the 
group adjusts.   
  There are several advantages to using this statistic to measure the speed of adjustment of real 
exchange rates.  First, as we have alluded to, the VAR specification does not suffer from the 
inconsistency that modeling all real exchange rates as AR1s does.  Second, as is well known, OLS 
estimation is efficient even with errors that are correlated across real exchange rates.  Third, while 
the real exchange rates for each group of countries are all calculated relative to a base country, the 
eigenvalues are independent of the choice of base country. 
  If the real exchange rate system is stationary, the asymptotic distribution of the largest 
eigenvalue is standard.  But we cannot be certain of stationarity.   Even if the system is stationary, 
we cannot be certain that the asymptotic distribution is reliable in small samples.  So we undertake 
Monte Carlo and bootstrap exercises.  The most straightforward null hypothesis to test for each VAR 
is that all real exchange rates in the group are simple random walks.
16   
  The test statistics are reported in Table 5a.  First, notably, these tests do not have enough 
power to reject the unit root hypothesis for the vast majority of country groups.  Only for the 
European group and the ECCA currency union can we reject the unit-root null at the 95 percent level 
of confidence, and then only with the bootstrap test.  We never reject the unit-root null with the 
Monte Carlo test.  Moreover, Table 5 reveals little difference in the persistence of real exchange 
rates among currency-union and non-currency-union groups.  There is no clear difference in the 
persistence (as measured by the largest eigenvalue), or in the p-values of the test statistics for the 
unit root null. 
  Table 5b reports similar statistics for groups of cities within each of seven countries.  This 




speed of adjustment are not comparable.
17  But, even with the city data, there is only one country for 
which we can clearly reject the unit-root null: Canada.   
  To sum up, Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the speed of adjustment of real exchange rates is not 
clearly related to monetary union, or even political union.  This result is perhaps not surprising.  The 
literature has found mixed results concerning the speed of adjustment of prices within countries and 
across borders.  Parsley and Wei (1996) find that prices converge rapidly between cities in the U.S.  
The speed of convergence is much greater than is typically found for real exchange rates between 
countries (see Rogoff (1996).)  But, their data is for prices of very narrowly defined goods (as 
opposed to the aggregate price indexes used in international comparisons), and they have no 
comparable data for countries other than the U.S.  In contrast, Rogers and Jenkins (1995) and Engel, 
Hendrickson and Rogers (1997) find no significant difference between intranational and 
international speeds of convergence of aggregate real exchange rates. 
  In contrast, there is a well-known “border” effect for short-term volatility of real exchange 
rates.  For example, Engel and Rogers (1996) find that U.S.-Canadian relative prices are far more 
volatile than relative prices between cities within each country, even taking into account distance 
between cities.  We ask here whether currency unions have a similar effect in reducing real exchange 
rate volatility.  In Table 6 we report results from regressions of the form: 
 
    ij ij ij ij Z CU qvol e d b a + • + + = . 
 
Here,  ij qvol  is a measure of the volatility of the real exchange rate of countries i and j.  We use as 
our measure the standard deviation of the residual from the AR1 regressions discussed above.  This 
measures the volatility of shocks to real exchange rates, as distinct from variance arising from slow 




in a currency union.  ij Z  is a vector of other variables that are included in the regression as controls, 
and  ij e  is a random error. 
  The regression specifications across the five columns of Table 6 are identical to those of 
Table 4, except that the regressand is the volatility of the real exchange rate rather than its 
persistence.  In all specifications, the currency union dummy variable is negative and is highly 
significant in all but the last.  The specification that appears most plausible here is the third 
specification, which contains dummy variables for each country.  In this regression, the log of 
distance has a positive and significant sign, indicating that more distant countries have greater real 
exchange rate volatility.  The variance of the change in the (log) nominal exchange rate is a highly 
significant variable in this regression (and all others.)  Our interest is focussed on the currency union 
dummy, which is very statistically significant: being a member of a currency union reduces the 
standard deviation of annual real exchange rates by 6 percentage points.   
  We conclude that real exchange rates have much lower short-term volatility among currency-
union countries, even holding constant the volatility of the nominal exchange rate.  That is, the 
reduction in real exchange rate variance is not solely attributable to fixed exchange rates; currency-
union membership appears to stabilize real exchange rates through other channels as well.  But, real 
exchange rate volatility of currency union members is still higher on average than for cities within 
countries.  The average annual standard deviation of real exchange rates among currency union 
countries in our sample is 3.6 percent, compared to 1.1 percent for city pairs within the seven 
countries listed in the lower panel of Table 5. 
     
5.  Business Cycle Synchronization 
  We now examine whether countries that use the same currency tend to have more highly 




countries with highly synchronized business cycles forego little monetary independence if they share 
a common currency.  Thus countries with highly synchronized business cycles have a higher 
propensity to adopt a common currency.  Of course, since a common monetary policy also 
eliminates idiosyncratic monetary policy, causality flows in the reverse direction.   That is, members 
of a common currency union should experience more synchronized business cycles since they do not 
experience national monetary policy shocks.  Rather than try to determine either part of the 
relationship structurally, we are simply interested here in seeing whether members of a common 
currency area in fact experience more synchronized business cycles.  It is especially interesting to us 
since we have already found that currency union members are quite specialized in international 
trade, making them potentially subject to asymmetric shocks. 
  The regressions we estimate take the form: 
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where: Corr(s)ij denotes the estimated correlation between real GDP for country i and real GDP for 
country j de-trended with method s, CU is a binary dummy variable which is unity if countries i and 
j are members of the same currency union, a and d are nuisance coefficients, Z is a vector of 
controls, and e denotes omitted residual factors.  The coefficient of interest to us is b; a positive b 
indicates that two countries with a common currency tend to have more tightly correlated business 
cycles.  Since our analysis is reduced-form in nature, we are not able to tell whether countries with 
more tightly synchronized business cycles tend to belong to common currency areas, or whether 
membership in a currency union tends to synchronize business cycles (or both). 
  In forming the regressand, we take advantage of our macroeconomic data set (the list of 




we estimate the bivariate correlation between de-trended annual real GDP for countries i and j over 
the sample period 1960-1996 (or the maximum available span of data).
18  We use two different time-
series models to de-trend the data: (country-specific) first-differences of natural logarithms; and a 
log-linear time trend model.  After (the natural logarithm of) each country’s real GDP has been de-
trended, we then estimate simple bivariate correlations between the de-trended GDP series.
19 
Results are tabulated in Tables 7a and 7b.  Table 7a contains results where the regressand is 
constructed from GDP series de-trending via growth rates; Table 7b is the analogue with linear de-
trending. 
The extreme left column of each of the tables presents a simple OLS regression of business 
cycle synchronization on the currency union dummy variable.  We find a positive b coefficient, 
indicating that business cycles are more highly synchronized for countries that trade more.  The size 
and statistical significance of the estimate depends on the de-trending method employed. 
Six perturbations of the basic model are also displayed in Tables 7a and 7b to check the 
sensitivity of the analysis.  The first five perturbations (all estimated with OLS) simply add extra 
control regressors to the right hand side of the equation (i.e., extra Z’s).  We choose the five different 
sets of regressors used in Table 3, (this encompasses the controls used by Clark and van Wincoop 
(2000); other controls sets, including country fixed effects, deliver similar results).   Robust t-
statistics are displayed in parentheses. 
The estimates in the tables indicate that business cycles are in fact more tightly synchronized 
for members of a currency union.  The exact point estimate depends on both the de-trending method 
and the exact set of auxiliary regressors.  But the coefficient is consistently positive and almost 
always statistically significant at conventional levels.  Being a member of a common currency area 
increases international business cycle correlations by perhaps .1, an economically significant 
amount.




In the extreme right column, the natural log of bilateral trade between countries i and j is 
used as the sole control regressor, following Frankel and Rose (1998).  This is an important test of 
the model, since Clark and van Wincoop find that inclusion of trade as a control destroys the border 
effect.  When trade is included, its coefficient is estimated with IV, using the first nine regressors of 
the gravity equation as instrumental variables.
21  Trade appears to have a strong positive effect on 
business cycle synchronization.  This result twins well with the literature.  For instance, Frankel and 
Rose (1998) found that increased international trade induces more tightly synchronized business 
cycles, using data for the OECD; our result is consistent with theirs.  However, controlling for trade 
does not destroy the significance of b. 
To summarize, countries that are members of a common currency union tend to have more 
highly synchronized business cycles; the correlation is perhaps .1 higher on average for currency 
union members than for non-members.  While economically and statistically significant, the size of 
this effect is small in an absolute sense.  Most recently, Clark and van Wincoop (2000) compare the 
coherences of business cycles within countries and across countries, using annual data for both 
employment and real GDP.  They show that intranational business cycle correlations are 
approximately .7 for regions within countries, but in the range of (.2,.4) for comparable regions 
drawn across countries.  That is, the effect of international borders on business cycle synchronization 
ranges between .3 and .5.   Thus, only a small part of the “border effect” is explained by membership 
in a common currency area. 
 
6.  Risk sharing 
  In this section, we turn to international risk sharing.  It is well known that the apparent degree 
of international risk sharing is low.  In a classic contribution, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found 




international risk sharing.  Alternatively, if risk-sharing opportunities were widespread, there should 
be little country-specific idiosyncratic consumption risk.  As Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) 
noted, consumption should be more highly correlated across countries than output in the presence of 
risk sharing.  In fact, the data show the opposite.  Furthermore, as French and Poterba (1991) and 
others have reported, there is strong home bias in asset holdings.  There seems to be very little 
international diversification of portfolios. 
  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have argued that international risk sharing might be diminished 
in the presence of transactions costs.  Specifically, they cite costs of trading goods (rather than 
assets) as an impediment to risk sharing.  They also note that these costs might conceivably be 
related to the need to make foreign exchange transactions in order to buy and sell goods 
internationally.  In other words, countries that are members of currency unions might do more risk 
sharing. 
  We run a cross-section regression of the form: 
 
    ij ij ij ij Z CU ccorr e d b a + • + + = . 
 
where,  ij ccorr  is calculated as the correlation of the first difference in the log of consumption per 
capita for country i with the analogue for country j.  The right-hand-side of the regression is of the 
same generic form as the regressions of the previous two sections.  Thus, ij CU  is a dummy variable 
which is unity if countries i and j were in a currency union;  ij Z  is a vector of control variables; and 
ij e  is a random error.  The consumption data in this section is taken from the Penn World Tables, 
and is adjusted for purchasing power parity.  The data are annual, and the maximum data span 
available is 1960-1992.




  Table 8 reports the regression results.  If risk sharing is greater among currency unions, we 
expect a positive coefficient on the currency union dummy.  If more distant countries find it more 
difficult to share risks, we also expect a negative coefficient on the log of distance.  We report results 
from six regressions.  All regressions include the currency union dummy and log distance as 
explanatory variables.  The first regression (reported in the first column) uses a single intercept.  The 
second regression uses a comprehensive set of country-specific fixed effects, so that both the 
dummies for i and j take on a value of one when the regressand is  ij ccorr .  The third regression is 
identical to the first regression, but is estimated with weighted least squares.
23  The second set of 
three regressions repeats the analysis, but augments the regression with the bivariate correlation 
between the growth rates of output (that is, the correlation of the first difference in the log of output 
for country i with the analogue for country j, the analogue to the regressand). 
  The results are weak.  The log of distance always enters significantly with the correct sign.  
The currency union dummy always enters with the correct sign.  However, it is not significant in the 
first specification; it is only of marginal significance in the second; and it is highly significant only 
in the third.  In all three estimates, the economic size of the effect of currency unions is small.  For 
instance, the currency union effect is to increase the consumption correlation by .04 percentage 
points with weighted least squares.  Since the intercept term in the regression is 0.31, then ignoring 
the effect of distance (that is, for two countries whose log distance is zero), being in a currency union 
raises the consumption correlation from 0.31 to 0.35. 
  Even these modest results may overstate the risk sharing opportunities within currency 
unions.  A high correlation of consumption for a pair of countries may not actually reflect greater 
risk sharing opportunities between those two countries.  It may simply reflect less idiosyncratic risk.  
That is, the consumption of two countries may be correlated simply because their output is 




correlation that should not be interpreted as indicating substantial international risk sharing.  
  This concern is particularly relevant since in the previous section we found that business 
cycles are more highly correlated for currency union countries.  So controlling for the degree of 
output correlation is a potentially important robustness check.  We pursue this by adding the actual 
correlation of (detrended) GDP per capita as a control in the right-hand columns of Table 8.  As it 
turns out, the output correlation coefficient is always statistically and economically significant as a 
control variable, but its presence has little effect on our estimate of b. 
  To summarize, we have found little statistically and economically significant evidence that 
international risk sharing is enhanced by membership in a currency union.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising, given the absence of substantive international fiscal transfer arrangements and the 
shallow private financial markets of most currency union members. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the dollarization dialogue by quantifying some of the features 
associated with common currencies, using actual data.  Using the historical record, we have found 
that the extra degree of integration associated with a common currency is substantial but finite.  
Members of international currency unions tend to experience more trade, less volatile exchange 
rates, and more synchronized business cycles than do countries with their own currencies.  Of 
course, since well-integrated countries are more likely to adopt a common currency, some of these  
integration “effects” of currency union may be illusory.  That is, the causality may flow from 
integration to currency union rather than the reverse.  In any case, while members of international 
currency unions are more integrated than countries with their own monies, they remain far from 
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Table 1: Descriptive Macroeconomic Statistics and Measures of Openness 
           ---- Whole Sample ----        --- Currency Unions --- 
  Obs.  Mean  St.Dev.  Obs.  Mean  St.Dev.  Test of 
Equality 
(p-val.) 
Real GDP per capita ($)  2454  5285  5262  416  3615  4474  .00 
Population (millions)  5102  23.6  9.3  1052  1.8  2.7  .00 
Inflation (%)  4152  40.3  499  672  7.8  9.0  .00 
M2/GDP (%)  3197  38.0  23.9  510  30.4  16.7  .00 
Loan Rate – LIBOR (%)  2131  72.7  2643  412  5.2  6.9  .24 
Loan Rate – LIBOR (%) 
(inflation<100%) 
1858  7.6  13.3  348  5.4  7.2  .00 
Output Growth Rate 
volatility (std dev, %) 
211  6.1  5.5  51  5.9  3.1  .17 
Budget Deficit (% GDP)  2289  -3.6  5.8  268  -3.7  6.1  .84 
Exports (% GDP)  4732  32.3  23.7  783  39.8  23.5  .00 
Imports (% GDP)  4729  37.8  25.4  783  53.2  27.1  .00 
Export Duties  
(% exports) 
1621  3.4  6.1  237  2.6  3.8  .00 
Import Duties  
(% imports) 
2226  12.3  9.6  241  18.0  8.4  .00 
Trade Taxes (% 
Revenue) 
2252  19.5  17.1  300  31.9  20.1  .00 
Current Account 
(% GDP) 
2942  -4.5  11.5  477  -8.3  13.3  .00 
|Current Account| 
 (% GDP) 
2942  7.3  10.0  477  10.8  11.4  .00 
Gross FDI (% GDP)  2058  1.5  2.6  339  2.0  3.4  .00 
Private Capital Flows 
(% GDP) 
2067  12.0  31.6  352  22.4  67.6  .00 




Table 2a: Measures of Specialization 
                                      - Herfindahl Index -   - Number Exports - 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Non-Currency Union Members  2657  .23  .24  254  132 
Currency Union Members  388  .31  .19  132  89 
 
Table 2b: Regression-Based tests of Specialization 
                --------------- Regressors ----------------- 
Regressand:  Real GDP 
per capita 
Population  Currency 
Union 
Controls 














































Absolute values of robust t-statistics recorded in parentheses.  Intercepts not reported.   
Sample size = 2,806 throughout. 
* Coefficients for real GDP per capita (population) multiplied by 10
4 (10





Table 3: Gravity Models of International Trade for 1995 




















(Log Product) Real 



































































Number of Landlocked 
Countries 
      -.62 
(.06) 
 
(Log of) Sum of Land 
Area 
      -.25 
(.02) 
 
(Log of) Product of 
Land Area 
        -.18 
(.01) 
Number of Island 
Countries 
        .14 
(.05) 
R
2  .71  .72  .72  .74  .74 
RMSE  1.757  1.724  1.703  1.663  1.656 
OLS estimation.  Robust standard errors recorded in parentheses.  Intercepts not recorded. 




Table 4:  Real Exchange Rate Persistence and Currency Unions 
 


















































Number of observations  3647  3647  3647  3647  3236 











Absolute values of robust t-statistics recorded in parentheses. 




Table 5a:  Real Exchange Rate VARs and Currency Unions 
 
Country grouping  Currency 
union? 




Africa   No  0.998  0.82  0.71 
Asia   No  1.005  0.79  0.66 
Europe   No  0.947  0.07  0.01 
North America   No  1.031  0.90  0.86 
South America   No  0.940  0.25  0.13 
Oceania   No  0.950  0.69  0.62 
Belgium-Lux.  Yes  0.944  0.77  0.30 
Britain-Ireland  Yes  0.876  0.73  0.56 
Bhutan-India  Yes  0.648  0.37  0.34 
France  Yes  0.915  0.67  0.21 
South Africa  Yes  0.882  0.55  0.40 
ECCA  Yes  0.753  0.10  0.01 
USA 1  Yes  1.036  0.97  0.94 
USA 2  Yes  1.166  0.99  0.99 
CFA 1  Yes  1.071  0.99  0.99 
CFA 2  Yes  0.990  0.75  0.63 
 
Table 5b: Real Exchange Rate Convergence between Cities within Countries 




USA  0.977  0.16  0.10 
Canada  0.980  0.01  0.01 
Mexico  0.986  0.09  0.05 
Germany  0.985  0.14  0.06 
Italy  0.993  0.43  0.26 
Spain  0.993  0.39  0.34 
Switzerland  0.976  0.09  0.07 
 
 




Table 6:  Real Exchange Rate Volatility and Currency Unions 
 
















































Number of observations  3647  3647  3647  3647  3236 















Table 7a: Business Cycle Synchronization and Currency Unions 
Real GDP de-trended via growth rates 
 

























(Log Product) Real 
GDP per capita 











(Log Product) Real 
GDP 































































        .00 
(0.0) 
   
(Log of) Sum of Land 
Area 
        .00 
(0.6) 
   
(Log of) Product of 
Land Area 
          .00 
(2.2) 
 
Number of Island 
Countries 
          -.02 
(2.9) 
 
(Log of) Bilateral 
Trade 
            .02 
(12.5) 
RMSE  .262  .235  .234  .233  .233  .233  .241 
Regressand is bilateral correlation of real GDPs (1960-1996), de-trended by first-difference of natural logs. 
OLS estimation, except for last column (IV with first 10 regressors as instrumental variables). 
Absolute robust t-statistics recorded in parentheses.  Intercepts not recorded. 
Sample size = 4419, except for bivariate regression where sample size = 5913.   




Table 7b: Business Cycle Synchronization and Currency Unions 
Real GDP de-trended via linear time trend 
 

























(Log Product) Real 
GDP per capita 











(Log Product) Real 
GDP 































































        -.01 
(0.5) 
   
(Log of) Sum of Land 
Area 
        .02 
(2.9) 
   
(Log of) Product of 
Land Area 
          .03 
(8.4) 
 
Number of Island 
Countries 
          -.04 
(3.4) 
 
(Log of) Bilateral 
Trade 
            .02 
(9.4) 
RMSE  .447  .449  .448  .447  .446  .442  .464 
Regressand is bilateral correlation of real GDPs (1960-1996), de-trended by time trend. 
OLS estimation, except for last column (IV with first 10 regressors as instrumental variables). 
Absolute robust t-statistics recorded in parentheses.  Intercepts not recorded. 
Sample size = 4419, except for bivariate regression where sample size = 5913. 

































Constant  .29 
(7.8) 
























  Absolute value of robust t-statistics reported in parentheses 
 Table A1: Members of Monetary Unions with WDI Data 
(* denotes country treated as anchor in multilateral currency unions) 
 
























Micronesia Fed. Sts. 
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Iran Islamic Rep. 
Iraq 
Ireland 
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1  We define “dollarization” as a situation where a country does not have its own sovereign money; the currency it 
uses need not be a dollar (US or other). 
2  McKinnon (1963) has argued that in practice real exchange rate behavior does not appreciably depend on the 
choice of monetary regime, and the desire to influence real exchange rate behavior is not a justification for having 
an independent currency. 
3  We disregard labor mobility since it is so difficult to construct an appropriate data set, and since monetary policy 
can only be used to offset transitory nominal shocks where labor movement is probably inappropriate.  We also 
ignore asset and financial market integration. 
4 Our investigation is in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) who urge the profession to examine the 
consequences of (presumably small) costs of international trade.  Frankel and Rose (1998) raise the possibility that 
the degree of integration among economies (and hence their suitability for membership in a currency union) might 
increase upon the formation of a common currency area. 
5  It is difficult to examine the direction of causality since currency unions are long-lived.  Rose (2000) provides 
more analysis which supports the idea that currency union tends to promote trade integration rather than the reverse. 
6  There are however many missing observations for variables of interest.   
7  In the case of multilateral currency unions, there is no clear anchor  
8  This has been augmented with data from the UN’s International Trade Statistics Yearbook. 
9  The specialization data set includes usable observations for the following countries: Algeria,  Angola,  Argentina,  
Australia,  Austria,  Bahamas,  Bahrain,  Bangladesh,  Barbados,  Belgium,  Belize,  Benin,  Bhutan,  Bolivia,  
Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Burkina Faso,  Burundi,  C.A.R.,  Cameroon,  Canada,  Chad,  Chile,  China,  Colombia,  
Comoros,  Congo,  Costa Rica,  Cyprus, Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  Djibouti, Dominican Rep.,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  
El Salvador,  Ethiopia,  Fiji,  Finland,  France,  Gabon,  Gambia,  Germany East,  Germany West,  Ghana,  Greece,  
Guatemala,  Guinea,  Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Hong Kong,  Hungary,  Iceland,  India,  
Indonesia,  Iran,  Iraq,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Ivory Coast,  Jamaica,  Japan,  Jordan,  Kenya,  Korea,  Kuwait,  Laos,  
Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Malaysia,  Mali,  Malta,  Mauritania,  Mauritius,  Mexico,  Mongolia,  Morocco,  
Mozambique,  Myanmar,  Nepal,  Netherlands,  New Zealand,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Norway,  Oman,  
Pakistan,  Panama, Papua N. Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Philippines,  Poland,  Portugal,  Qatar,  Reunion,  Romania,  
Rwanda,  Saudi Arabia,  Senegal,  Seychelles,  Sierra Leone,  Singapore,  Solomon Is.,  Somalia,  South Africa,  
Spain,  Sri Lanka,  St. Kitts & Nevis,  Sudan,  Suriname,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Syria,  Taiwan,  Tanzania,  
Thailand,  Togo, Trinidad & Tobago,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  U.A.E.,  U.K.,  U.S.A.,  U.S.S.R.,  Uganda,  Uruguay,  
Venezuela,  Yemen,  Yugoslavia,  Zaire,  Zambia,  and Zimbabwe. 
10  SITC Code 11 denotes “Animals of the Bovine Species, incl. Buffaloes, live.”  Other examples of 4-digit sub-
groups include: “Tyres, pneumat. new, of a kind used on buses, lorries” (SITC code 6252), and “Int. combustion 
piston engines for marine propuls.” (SITC code 7133). 
11  Our findings are not affected by the inclusion of quadratic terms for income as in Imbs and Wacziarg (2000). 
12  This specialization makes them more vulnerable to industry-specific shocks, and might be expected to increase 
the idiosyncratic nature of their business cycles. 
13  The 1998 World Factbook available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html. 
14  We sometimes include a control for common membership in a regional free trade agreement.  We include a 
number of such agreements, including: the EU; the Canada-US FTA; EFTA; the Australia/New Zealand closer 
economic relationship; the Israeli/US FTA; ASEAN; CACM; PATCRA; CARICOM; SPARTECA; and the 
Cartagena Agreement, all taken from the WTO’s web site (http://www.wto.org/wto/develop/webrtas.htm). 
15  We only estimate the AR1 if there are at least fifteen observations for each country. 
16  Under the Monte Carlo experiment, we assume that the errors have a Normal distribution, with a covariance 
matrix equal to the sample covariance of the first-differences of the (logs) of the real exchange rates.  We measure 
the frequency with which the largest eigenvalue is smaller than the estimated largest eigenvalue for each group, 
based on 5000 replications with sample sizes equal to the sample size of our data.  Under the bootstrap experiment, 
we use the first differences of the actual (log) real exchange rates to construct our bootstrap sample.  We sample, 
with replacement, the vector of real exchange rate changes at each date, thus maintaining the structure of correlation 
across real exchange rates within each group.  As with the Monte Carlo statistics, we measure the frequency with 
which the largest eigenvalue is smaller than the estimated largest eigenvalue for each group, based on 5000 




17  It might be natural to compare the eigenvalues by raising the city-level eigenvalues to the twelfth power, but that 
would only be a rough approximation given that the annual CPI data is average for the year, not end-of-period. 
18  We only estimate the bilateral correlation if we have at least five matching GDP observations for each country. 
19  Thus, we first separately de-trend Afghani and Australian real GDP with linear time trend models.  Then we 
estimate the correlation between the two de-trended real GDPs over time (the actual correlation is -.002).  We then 
repeat this procedure for all possible country pairs, resulting in a vector of correlations.  De-trending via taking 
deviations of growth rates (first-differences of natural logarithms) from the average (country-specific) growth rate 
yields another measure of the regressand.  For regressors, we use the same set of regressors used in the gravity 
model of trade.  That is, we model business cycle synchronization as being a function of the distance between the 
countries, the product of their real GDPs, the product of their real GDP per capitas, and so forth. 
20   As a robustness check, we have substituted the correlation between labor forces for the correlation between 
GDPs (employment, unemployment, and industrial production data are simply not available for many countries even 
at the annual frequency).  This regressand also delivers a consistently positive, statistically significant effect of 
currency union on business cycle coherence. 
21  This is necessary because while trade may effect business cycle synchronization, it is equally plausible that 
causality flows in the reverse direction, as pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1998). 
22  Again, we only estimate the bilateral correlation if we have at least fifteen matching observations for each 
country. 
23  Specifically, we give proportionately greater weight to observations in which the correlation is based on more 
data.  That is, when we can base a correlation on thirty-two years of data, that correlation in the cross-section 
regression receives double the weight of a correlation based on only sixteen years of data. 
 